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WE4SHINGTON LAW REVIEW
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce-Jurisdiction to Grant Custody. In Hammond v. Ham-
mond,' the mother of two minor children obtained a decree of divorce
in the state of Idaho. The summons and complaint were served upon
the father personally in the state of Washington, but he made no
appearance and was adjudged to be in default. The decree awarded
custody of the children, who were in Idaho, to the mother. A short
time thereafter, the father took the children to Washington and refused
to return them to her. She brought a writ of habeas corpus in Wash-
ington to regain custody. In defense, the father alleged that the Idaho
court lacked jurisdiction over the divorce action because the wife had
met neither the domicile nor residence requirements. The trial court
upheld these contentions and refused to issue the writ.
The supreme court, on appeal, reversed the lower court's ruling. It
found that the Idaho court did have jurisdiction to decree divorce, and
that the Idaho decree should be given full faith and credit.
The court reiterated the well established principle that domicile is
a question of physical presence and intent, - and pointed out that the
one asserting the lack of jurisdiction on a domicile issue must sustain
the burden of proving such an assertion.' "We cannot say that it has
been affirmatively shown that the facts necessary to give the Idaho
court jurisdiction in the divorce action did not exist."4 Here, as in most
cases, the requisite intent is the primary object of proof. Because the
testimony of the wife and the surrounding circumstances indicated an
intent to establish domicile in Idaho,' the supreme court was justified
in finding that the evidence presented established that domicile.
The Washington court also reversed the trial court's finding that the
Idaho residence requirement went to the jurisdiction of the court. An
Idaho statute required residence in Idaho "for six full weeks next
preceding the commencement of the action".' The issue arose because
of a variance of three days between the date the mother alleged and
first testified that she went to Idaho and her later testimony on the
same subject. The Washington court pointed out that the jurisdiction
145 Wn.2d 855, 278 P.2d 387 (1954).
2 Maple v. Maple, 29 Wn2d 858, 189 P.2d 976 (1948) ; Williams v. State of North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944).
3 Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wn.2d 258, 170 P.2d 316 (1946).
4 Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wn2d at 358, 278 P.2d at 389.
5The evidence and testimony indicated that the mother took the children to Idaho
and lived with a maternal aunt. Shortly thereafter, she obtained a job and rented an
apartment for herself and the children.
6 IDAHO CODE, § 32-701.
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of the Idaho court in divorce actions is conferred by the constitution
of that state.7 The fact that the Idaho legislature passed an act pro-
viding that a divorce should not be granted unless the plaintiff has met
that statutory requirement does not in any way diminish the jurisdic-
tion of the court.' The court said that even where the fact of residence
for a required time has been established by a fraud perpetrated on the
court, such fraud is intrinsic and cannot be attacked in a collateral
proceeding. In the instant case, the period for appeal had elapsed, and
the father's collateral attack on this issue would necessarily fail.'
Conceding then that the Washington court was justified in finding
that the mother was domiciled in Idaho, and the residence requirement
could not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the result in the
Hammond case is probably correct in deciding that the Idaho court
had jurisdiction over the divorce action. This would indicate that the
Idaho divorce decree was entitled to the full faith and credit awarded
it by Washington in the habeas corpus proceeding. However, it does
not follow that the custody decree should be awarded the same full
faith and credit.
The father's actions indicate that his primary purpose after the
divorce decree was granted was to obtain custody of the children, and
not to have the divorce declared a nullity. This objective might have
been reached if the father's collateral attack had been directed to the
jurisdiction of the court with respect to the custody decree alone. The
divisibility of divorce decrees is recognized with regard to alimony and
property awards.1" This divisibility doctrine has recently been ex-
tended to custody decrees by the Supreme Court of the United States. 1
Assuming that the Washington court would recognize and apply this
doctrine, a jurisdictional attack on the Idaho court's right to award
7 "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in
equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." IDAHO CONST., art.
5, § 13; This section had been interpreted in Fox v. Flynn, 27 Idaho 580, 150 Pac.
44 (1915).
N The Idaho supreme court had interpreted the statute and constitutional provision
together in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031 (1949). In that case
the court said that the residence requirement merely prescribed a condition which the
plaintiff had to meet to entitle him to a divorce. It said that this requirement does not
go to the jurisdiction of the court.
c' The Washington court has confined collateral attacks in similar situations. For
analogy, see Batey v. Batey, 35 VWn.2d 791, 800, 215 P.2d 694, 700 (1950) ("a collateral
attack may not be made upon a judgment where the absence of jurisdiction does not
appear upon the record") ; Peyton v. Peyton, 28 Wash. 278, 68 Pac. 757 (1902) ; In re
Higdon, 30 Wn.2d 546, 192 P.2d 744 (1948) ; Bass v. Smith, 26 Wn.2d 872, 176 P.2d
355 (1947).
-, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) ; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948);
Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279 (1947).
11 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952).
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custody in the Hammond case might have been successful.
In May v. Anderson,2 the United States Supreme Court recognized
the above doctrine and considered whether or not the full faith and
credit clause requires one state to follow the child custody order ren-
dered by a sister state which had personal jurisdiction over only one
parent. In the May case, a father domiciled in Wisconsin sued in that
state for a divorce from his wife who had moved to Ohio and expressed
her intent not to return. The summons and complaint were served upon
the mother personally in Ohio. She made no appearance and the father
was awarded a default decree. The decree awarded custody of the
children to the father. The mother, who had the children in Ohio when
the decree was rendered, surrendered them to him. Four years later,
the children visited their mother in Ohio and she refused to return
them. The father brought a writ of habeas corpus in an Ohio court,
relying on the Wisconsin custody order. The court awarded the Wis-
consin decree full faith and credit and ordered the writ to issue. This
order was affirmed by the Ohio State supreme court." On appeal, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the state court and held
that the Wisconsin decree, because rendered without personal jurisdic-
tion over the mother, was not entitled to full faith and credit. The
court did not squarely decide whether or not the Wisconsin decree
violated due process. Rather, the court based its decision on the ground
that a parental right to custody of children is a personal right which
cannot be cut off by an ex parte decree, at least with a binding affect
upon a sister state. After calling attention to the well settled rule that
the full faith and credit clause does not entitle a judgment to extrater-
ritorial effect if it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person
sought to be bound,'4 the court found that the Wisconsin decree was
rendered without such jurisdiction. It rejected the argument based on
the domicile and jurisdiction of the children and said that even if the
children's domicile was that of the father, personal jurisdiction over the
mother was still necessary to terminate her parental right to custody.
It is apparent then, that the May case establishes one minimum juris-
dictional requirement before a custody decree will extraterritorially
bind the party whose parental right is being terminated. Whatever
other requirements must be met, there must be personal jurisdiction
over the parent sought to be bound.
12 Ibid.
"3 Anderson v. May, 157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N.E.2d 648 (1952).
14Baker v. Baker, Eccles and Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1916); Thompson v. Whitman,
U.S. (1873).
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The May case presents substantially the same situation encountered
in the Hammond case, where the Idaho custody order was rendered
without personal jurisdiction over the father. When the Washington
court recognized the decree and issued the writ of habeas corpus, the
May v. Anderson result was directly contradicted.
This inconsistency is understandable since the pleadings in the
Hammond case attacked only the jurisdictional question with regard
to the marital status of the parties. Jurisdiction to deprive the father
of his parental rights was never put directly into issue in the case, and
the Washington court had no occasion to consider the May case until
a petition for rehearing was filed. However, should such a case arise
again in Washington, and the party is interested in custody of the
children only, a stronger argument would seem to lie along the lines of
the May case approach.
Alimony in Washington. In Loomis v. Loomis,"5 the Washington
Supreme Court chose to bridge a gap in the 1949 Divorce Act. In that
case the court interpreted RCW 26.08.110 as conferring upon it the
power to award alimony in the case of an absolute divorce involving no
minor or dependent children. The court decided that the "disposition
of property" section included the power to award future alimony pay-
ments as well as the power to effect a present division of property.
The provision granting the judiciary the power to modify alimony
awards was also relied upon as necessarily implying that the court had
the power to award alimony in the first instance. Though the latter
ground is tenuous in some respects,"0 the former had been the basis
for alimony awards under previous divorce statutes.
The significance of the decision is twofold. First, the Washington
court has for the first time expressly recognized that it has no inherent
power to award alimony in the case of an absolute divorce where there
are no minor or dependent children involved. Inherent power of this
nature has traditionally been limited to fields where there are compar-
able common law and equitable counterparts. Second, and more
important, the supreme court has indicated its willingness to qualify
15 147 Wash. Dec. 417, 288 P.2d 235 (1955).
16 This provision could just as logically mean that the court should have the power
to modify existing alimony awards prior to the 1933 amendment, or to modify alimony
awards of other states. For analysis of this possibility, see Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51,
165 Pac. 1063 (1917).
17 For a collection and analysis of these cases, see Comment, Alimony in Washington:
A Note to the Legislature, 26 WAsH. L. REv. 135 (1950).
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this traditional view to some extent by liberally construing legislation
in this field.
Though the Loomis case is by no means startling, the reasoning in
it may lead to more surprising results in other areas of domestic rela-
tions. These more surprising results may soon be forthcoming. The
case of Jones v. Jones's is now pending before the supreme court.
Essentially it involves an appeal from an alimony award by the
Superior Court of King County. The award was granted in a decree
of nullity under RCW 26.08.030 and RCW 26.08.050. The husband
has appealed on the ground that there can be no alimony awarded in
an action declaring the non-existence of a marriage. It is apparent
from a literal reading of RCW 26.08.110,' that if the Loomis case
reasoning is strictly adhered to, the alimony award could be sustained.
The words "divorce" and "annulment" are used together throughout
the entire statute. The conjunction "and" would seem to indicate that
the same "disposition of property" provision that applies to one would
naturally apply to the other proceeding. Upon this reasoning the court
could logically find that if the power to award alimony in the case of
divorce exists, it must necessarily exist in the case of an annulment.
Such a result would be without precedent in Washington. Legislative
clarification may be desirable if the statute is to lend itself to this
interpretation."O*
DAVID WAYNE GITTINGER
18 Docket No. 33113, argued Jan., 1956.
19 The pertinent provisions of RCW 26.08.110 are as follows:
* * * * If the court determines that either party, or both, is entitled to a
divorce or annulment, judgment shall be entered accordingly, granting the
party in whose favor the court decides a decree of full and complete divorce
or annulment, and making such disposition of the property of the parties,
either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable, having
regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they
will be left by such divorce or annulment, to the party through whom the
property was acquired, and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefits of
the children, and shall make provisions for costs, and for the custody, support
and education of the minor children of such marriage. Such decree as to
alimony and the care, custody, support and education of the children may be
modified, altered and revised by the court from time to time as circumstances
may require. Such decree, however, as to the dissolution of the marital relation
and to the custody, management and division of the property shall be final
and conclusive upon both parties subject only to the right to appeal as in civil
cases. * * * *"
20 It is interesting to note that this result was called to the attention of the legislature
and the court five years preceding the Loomis case. See Comment, Alimony in Wash-
ington: A Note to the Legislature, 26 WASH. L. REv. 135 (1950).
* Since this article has gone to press, the court has affirmed the alimony award in
Jones v. Jones, basing its decision on the Loomis case approach, three judges dissent-
ing. [Ed.]
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